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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOHN QUAS, : Case No. 890601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 27, 1991, this Court ordered the parties to 
submit supplemental briefs discussing the following issue: 
Whether any error in allowing the information to 
be refiled was merely harmless error where the 
magistrate subsequently found probable cause to 
bindover. and where defendant was later convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(emphasis added)• 
It must first be noted that the error involved in this case 
extends from the improper refiling of the information, to the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause, because that finding 
involved the magistrate's failure to apply the Brickey due process 
standards in entering the bindover order following the successive 
preliminary hearing. See opening brief of Appellant at 10 through 
27; reply brief of Appellant at 5 through 9; petition for rehearing 
at 5. 
It is Mr. Quas' position that if any harmless error 
analysis applies, it must be limited to the effect of the conviction 
in the trial court, and should not encompass the effect of the 
magistrate's probable cause finding, because the magistrate's 
probable cause finding is part of the error. 
The issue posed by the Court is a question of Utah State 
Constitutional law, a matter of first impression, requiring this 
Court to make original legal findings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The standards for refiling informations set forth in State 
v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), are guaranteed by Article I 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. It has yet to be determined 
whether harmless error analysis applies to Brickey violations of 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and if so, what that 
analysis should be. 
The plain language of Article I section 7, and various 
other State Constitutional provisions precludes the harmless error 
analysis under consideration by this Court.1 
Assuming arguendo that some form of harmless error analysis 
could allow the State to deprive a person of liberty without due 
1. Counsel for Mr. Quas is aware that this Court desires 
extensive analysis of state constitutional issues. E.g. State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-1273 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Due to the 
time constraints imposed, counsel for Mr. Quas limits the analysis 
primarily to the plain language of the Utah Constitution. 
Counsel for Mr. Quas maintains, however, that reliance on 
the plain language of the Utah Constitution is proper, and comports 
with the State Constitutional mandate of separation of government 
powers. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, section 46.03 
(explaining how courts maintain the integrity of judicial and 
legislative functions by following the plain language of laws); 
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (separation of powers 
provision). 
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process of law under the Utah Constitution, no such analysis could 
compensate for the illegal refiling of the information and bindover 
order in this case. 
In Utah, district court jurisdiction in criminal cases is 
contingent on the legality of the bindover order from the magistrate 
presiding over the preliminary hearing. In this case, the 
magistrate's bindover order was illegal because it violated the due 
process requirements set forth in State v. Brickey, supra. The 
illegal bindover order failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
district court, and the jury's verdict is a nullity. 
In the absence of the illegal refiling and bindover order, 
the result in this case would have been different. Had the 
magistrate applied the Utah due process standards set forth in State 
v. Brickey. there would have been no bindover order, no trial and no 
conviction in this case unless and until the State met the Brickey 
standards. 
On appeal, Mr. Quas has challenged all material evidence of 
his guilt. If this Court were to address all issues raised on the 
merits, the conviction would not stand to compensate for the due 
process violation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
DOES NOT APPLY TO BRICKEY VIOLATIONS OF 
ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
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The refiling of the information and bindover order violated 
the standards set forth in State v, Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986). See opening brief of Appellant at 10-27 and reply brief of 
Appellant at 5-9. Brickey is explicitly decided under Article I 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 714 P.2d at 646. 
The Utah Constitution has no harmless error provision, and 
in fact, contains a provision requiring absolute fidelity to each 
constitutional provision. Article I section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution provides, 
The provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
The plain language of this provision requires a literal 
reading of Article I section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991), the Utah Supreme Court recently interpreted Article I 
section 7 with Article I section 11 (the open courts provision),2 
2. The open courts provision supports Mr. Quas' position, 
discussed infra, that application of a harmless error analysis to 
the illegal refiling of the information in this case would violate 
his constitutional rights to relief from the due process violation. 
Article I section 11 provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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emphasizing the absolute nature of the right to due process in 
Utah. The court stated, 
[T]he mandate of the due process clause of 
article I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights 
in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive in its 
application to all activities of state 
government. It is the province of the judiciary 
to assure that a claim of the denial of due 
process by an arm of government be heard and, if 
justified, that it be vindicated. 
Id. at 735. 
The Utah jurisdictional framework of appeals of bindover 
orders counsels against the application of harmless error analysis 
based on convictions subsequent to the bindover orders. 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides all 
criminal defendants with "the right to appeal in all cases." 
Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides further, 
"Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there 
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." 
In State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App.), cert, 
granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), this Court characterized the 
magistrate's preliminary hearing as an exercise of original 
jurisdiction, and review of the magistrate's bindover order as an 
appeal. See 794 P.2d at 497-498. This Court ruled that 
jurisdiction over these appeals is to be found in the interlocutory 
appeals jurisdiction of this Court. Id. at 500. 
In the event that this Court denies a petition for 
interlocutory appeal in an improper refiling case, and that case 
- 5 -
goes to trial and results in a conviction, application of harmless 
error analysis would strip that defendant of a meaningful appeal of 
the improper bindover order. 
The Humphrey court implicitly recognized that because there 
are constitutional rights to appeal bindover orders, a conviction 
subsequent to an improper bindover order has no harmless error 
effect. Footnote 8 of Humphrey states, 
Defendants correctly claim that because the 
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is 
discretionary, defendants might be forced to go 
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file 
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is 
denied. 
Id. at 500 (emphasis added). 
Preliminary hearings are uniquely important in this State. 
See e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13 (preliminary 
hearing provision); State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1988)(discussing historical importance of preliminary hearings in 
Utah). Every person in this State is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing that comports with due process of law, and to a legal remedy 
if that due process is not afforded. See e.g. Article I section 13 
(right to preliminary hearing); Article I section 7 (right to due 
process of law); Article I section 11 (right to open courts); 
Article I section 12 (right to appeal in all cases); Article VIII 
section 5 (right to appeal from original to appellate jurisdiction); 
Article I section 26 (constitution is mandatory and prohibitory); 
Article I section 2 (the authority of free governments is founded on 
the right of all people to equal protection and benefit of the 
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government); Article I section 24 (requiring uniform operation of 
laws); Article VI section 26 (prohibiting private laws). 
It appears that harmless error analysis may be applied to 
some violations of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Anderson, 
612 P.2d 778, 786-787 (Utah 1980)(court applied harmless error 
analysis to violation of confrontation right at preliminary 
hearing). Given the unique Utah Constitutional framework governing 
the refiling of informations and bindover analysis in cases 
involving successive preliminary hearings, discussed supra, this 
Court should not apply harmless error analysis in this case. 
Further, it is not clear that harmless error analysis would 
apply under the Federal Constitution. See State v. Brickev, 714 
P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986)(Brickey is decided under State 
Constitution because federal law is unsettled); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 and n.8 (1967)(while some federal 
constitutional errors may never constitute harmless error, others 
may be considered harmless error if they are harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)(Court 
members differ concerning how to apply harmless error analysis to 
error of denial of counsel at preliminary hearing when defendant was 
subsequently convicted). 
II. 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
WOULD NOT COMPENSATE FOR 
THE ILLEGAL REFILING OF THE INFORMATION 
AND BINDOVER ORDER IN THIS CASE. 
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In the event that this Court determines that some harmless 
error analysis does apply, that analysis should be at least as 
stringent as the federal standard of harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Brickey, Chapman. and Coleman, supra. 
The analysis which follows demonstrates that under varying 
standards of harmless error, the improper filing of the information 
and subsequent improper bindover order do not constitute harmless 
error. 
A. THE ILLEGAL BINDOVER ORDER FAILED TO INVOKE THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
JURISDICTION; THE CONVICTION IS A NULLITY. 
Longstanding Utah case law establishes that the 
jurisdiction of the district court over a criminal case is 
contingent on the propriety of the preliminary hearing and bindover 
order. In State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937), the court 
explained, 
The right of the district court to try any one 
for a felony rests upon the filing in such court 
of a proper indictment by grand jury, or the 
filing of a proper information by the district 
attorney, or other proper counsel for the state. 
R.S.Utah 1933, 105-17-1. And such information 
can be filed properly, only after the accused has 
been duly bound over and held to answer in the 
district court by a magistrate having 
jurisdiction to investigate the charge and 
determine if there is probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed and that defendant 
is guilty thereof. Constitution of Utah, art. I, 
§ 13; ... And before the defendant can be so 
bound over and held to answer by the magistrate, 
he is entitled to a preliminary hearing, unless, 
with the consent of the State, he waives such 
hearing[.] 
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Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Tweed, 224 P. 443 (Utah 1924), the court 
emphasized that the district court may not proceed to trial if the 
defendant is not given the preliminary hearing to which he is 
constitutionally entitled. The court stated, 
Under our Constitution (article I §13), any 
one charged with a felony may be prosecuted 
either upon an indictment found by a grand jury 
or upon an information filed by the prosecuting 
attorney. In case the prosecution is based upon 
an information filed by the prosecuting attorney 
the accused is, however, entitled to a 
preliminary hearing before a magistrate before 
the information is lodged against him in the 
district court and, if it be made to appear to 
the district court before a plea on the merits is 
entered in that court that the accused had not 
been given a preliminary hearing, and that he had 
not waived such a hearing, the information may be 
quashed on motion of the accused and he cannot be 
legally tried in the district court until he has 
either been given the preliminary hearing 
provided for in the Constitution, or it be made 
to appear that he has waived such a hearing. 
Id. at 444 (emphasis added). 
Inasmuch as Brickey sets constitutional standards for 
preliminary hearings, if those standards are not met, the district 
court has no jurisdiction to try the defendant. See id. See also 
State v. Easthope. 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983)("[T]he district 
court, although having jurisdiction over the offense, §78-3-4, does 
not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant himself until he is 
bound over by the magistrate. State v. Freeman. 93 Utah 125, 
133-34, 71 P.2d 196, 200 (1937); State v. Truiillo. 117 Utah 237, 
243-45, 214 P.2d 626, 630-31 (1950).M). In cases where the district 
court proceeds to trial without jurisdiction, the conviction is a 
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nullity, and cannot compensate for the illegal bindover order* See 
Id. 
B. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ILLEGAL REFILING OF THE INFORMATION AND 
BINDOVER ORDER, THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. 
Under Chapman analysis, the illegal refiling of the 
information and bindover order were not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, for the trial and conviction of Mr. Quas resulted from the 
refiling and bindover order. If the magistrate had followed the due 
process standards, there would have been no bindover order, no 
trial, and no conviction, unless and until the State met the Brickev 
standards. 
Application of the harmless error analysis traditionally 
applied to non-constitutional error leads to the conclusion that 
harmless error analysis does not compensate for the Brickey 
violation in this case. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a) 
provides in part, "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as 
follows: 
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, an error 
requires reversal only if we conclude that absent 
the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
result more favorable to the accused. 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1989). 
In the absence of the due process violations, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result. Mr. Quas would not 
have been bound over, tried or convicted, unless and until the 
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prosecution met the Brickey due process standards. The lack of 
trial and conviction are certainly "a result more favorable" to Mr. 
Quas than was the homicide conviction. 
This Court should not analyze this case under an 
evidentiary harmless error standard, because the error in this case 
was not an evidentiary error, but a procedural constitutional 
error. Other Utah cases analyzing the effect of procedural errors 
involving the preliminary hearing do not attempt to compensate for 
errors by analyzing the weight of evidence presented at trial. 
In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the court 
assumed the correctness of the defendant's complaint that the arrest 
warrant was illegal, but concluded that such a defect was 
immaterial. The court noted that the only prejudice was 
insignificant pretrial delay, and that the full panoply of rights 
was extended to the defendant at trial. Id. at 270-272. In 
contrast, the court resolved all issues relating to errors at the 
preliminary hearing on the merits, and did not rely on the fact that 
the defendant had been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to 
diminish the significance of the potential preliminary hearing 
errors. This was so despite the fact that the defendant apparently 
did not attempt to obtain an interlocutory review of the bindover 
order. Id. at 266-270. 
In State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988), the court 
reversed a conviction for sexual abuse of a child because the charge 
encompassing the episode apparently proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
at trial was dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary 
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hearing. It appears from the court's footnote 2 at page 1139 that 
the magistrate's dismissal was improper, but that the State had 
failed to appeal the order. 
In State v. Poteet. 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984), the defendant 
was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the bail jumping and 
aggravated assault charges. Id. at 762. In disposing of his 
complaint that one of the preliminary hearings was delayed, the 
court indicated that the delay did not cause him undue pretrial 
incarceration because he was incarcerated on other charges while 
awaiting the belated preliminary hearing, and found no prejudice 
stemming from the violation of a rule of criminal procedure. Id. at 
764-765. The court did not discuss the lack of prejudice stemming 
from the procedural preliminary hearing error by focusing on the 
defendant's convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In State v. Lairbv. 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), overruled on 
other grounds in State v* Ossanna, 739 P.2d 628, 631 n.8 (Utah 
1987), the defendants complained that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that the magistrate 
erred in admitting affidavits into evidence, and that the 
prosecution suppressed mitigating evidence at the preliminary 
hearing. Id. 1193. The court rejected these claims because there 
was no official transcript of the preliminary hearing in the record, 
and noted in passing that the unofficial transcript reflected 
sufficient evidence to bind the case over. Id. at 1192 and n.l. 
The court dismissed the claim that one defendant's preliminary 
hearing was delayed by noting that the claim was waived and that the 
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defendant had failed to show prejudice. Id. at 1196. While the 
court did find that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
convictions, id. at 1208, the convictions were not used by the court 
as a basis for finding any errors alleged about the preliminary 
hearing harmless. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in State v. 
Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), the Court applied harmless error 
analysis to the violation of the defendants' constitutional right to 
confrontation in the preliminary hearing. In applying this harmless 
error analysis, the court assessed the impact of the error within 
the context of the preliminary hearing, and did not rely on evidence 
presented at trial resulting in criminal convictions. Id. at 
786-787. 
In the event that this Court applies an evidence-based 
harmless error analysis to the procedural constitutional error in 
this case, it is Mr. Quas' position that the improper refiling of 
the information and bindover order are not harmless error. 
Virtually all evidence of guilt is challenged in Mr. Quas' opening 
and reply briefs. If this Court were to address each issue raised 
on the merits, the conviction of Mr. Quas would not stand to 
compensate for the due process violations occurring at the 
preliminary hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
The improper refiling of the information and bindover order 
in this case do not constitute harmless error. 
Respectfully submitted this 4- day of October, 1991. 
LISA JVREMAL 
Attorney for Mr. Quas 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON 
Attorney foriMr. Quas 
HoiBROOK 
Attorney for Wr. Quas 
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